The Battle

12/30/07

Hitler conceived the Ardennes Offensive in the summer of 1944 as a powerful blow to split the Anglo-American armies and regain the initiative on the Western Front.  Overriding his generals’ objections, Hitler ordered preparations for a large-scale offensive with the ultimate objective of Antwerp.  He believed a severe setback would cause the Allied coalition to collapse, and at least permit the Germans to sue for a separate peace with the English and Americans.

Hitler’s plan called for a surprise armored thrust out of the heavily wooded Ardennes area of Belgium and Luxembourg.  The offensive would have to take place in poor weather to prevent Allied aircraft from swarming on the German tanks as they had in Normandy.  New “Volksgrenadier” infantry divisions were created from the remnants of units shattered in Normandy, and some of the best panzer divisions were refitted for the effort.  All operational and logistical preparations were shrouded in the greatest secrecy.  The deception was highly successful; no Allied commander really believed that the Germans were still capable of a powerful counteroffensive in the West, much less that they were actually preparing to launch it.

The main thrust was to be made by the 6. Panzerarmee, organized into two panzer corps with four panzer divisions, two volksgrenadier divisions, and a parachute division.  The more powerful 1. SS-Panzerkorps included the rebuilt 1. SS-Panzerdivision, the “Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler.”  Along with the other panzer divisions earmarked for the offensive, the LSSAH had received an influx of new personnel and equipment.  However, the panzer divisions of late 1944 were no longer as powerful as before.  None had a full complement of two tank battalions (one of Panthers and the other of PzKw IVs).  Some had their second battalions rounded out with assault guns, while others had corps level heavy tank or tank destroyer battalions attached to replace their missing second battalions.  s. SS-Pz.Abt. 501 was attached to the Leibstandarte’s 1. SS-Panzerregiment as that unit’s second battalion.

Following standard German practice, the SS panzer divisions tasked organized their units for combat as combined arms kampfgruppen, or battle groups.  Kampfgruppe size and organization varied, but was roughly equivalent to a U.S. reinforced regiment or armored combat command.  The 1. SS-Panzerdivision’s priority kampfgruppe assigned to spearhead the attack was built around the 1. SS-Panzerregiment.  The regiment’s commander was one of the most successful Waffen-SS armor leaders, SS-Obersturmbannführer Jochen Peiper.  Peiper’s kampfgruppe included his regiment, with a mixed tank battalion of Panthers and PzKw IVs and the attached s. SS-Pz.Abt. 501.  Also attached was the third battalion from the division’s 2. SS-Panzergrenadierregiment.  This armored infantry battalion, commanded by SS-Sturmbannführer Josef “Jupp” Diefenthal, was mounted in half-tracks.  Peiper also had his regiment’s organic pioneer and self-propelled Flak companies, plus an attached battalion from the 1. SS-Panzerartillerieregiment (105mm guns), an additional battery of self-propelled guns, another armored engineer company, and an attached Luftwaffe Flak battalion.  All of the kampfgruppe’s combat elements were motorized and armored.

Each of the lead battle groups of the 6. Panzerarmee were to exploit penetrations of the American front lines made by volksgrenadier divisions, then rapidly drive to intermediate objectives on the Meuse River.  Army headquarters assigned five routes called rollbahn for the kampfgruppen to use on their way to the Meuse.  While not totally restricted to exact routes, the kampfgruppe commanders were to follow the general route of their assigned rollbahn to prevent confusion and traffic jams.  Kampfgruppe Peiper was to use Rollbahn D, which in large part twisted and turned through the hilly terrain along secondary roads barely wide enough for the tanks.  Peiper remarked to U.S. interrogators after the war that his assigned route had been fit only for bicycles.  (1)  Due to his need for swift penetration and exploitation through the restricted terrain, Peiper planned for the Tiger battalion to bring up the rear of his kampfgruppe.  The Tigers would then lead through the more open terrain past the Meuse.

The number of tanks fielded by s. SS-Pz.Abt. 501 for the Ardennes Offensive has been a matter of debate.  Records and veteran accounts indicate that the battalion received its full complement of 45 Königstigers between 3 October and 3 December 1944.  How many of these actually participated in the attack is unknown.  According to a former 1. Kompanie tank commander, some did not leave the assembly area.  (2)  The battalion was plagued with maintenance problems and breakdowns, even early in the advance.  The Army Group B situation map for 17 December 1944 shows 30 Tigers present with the 1. SS-Panzerdivision.  At least 20 can be positively identified from photographic evidence or veterans’ accounts.  It is probable that the battalion was up to full strength or nearly so by 16 December, but that only around 30-35 of the Tigers actually participated as a unit in the initial advance of Kampfgruppe Peiper.  Others were readied or repaired later and fed into the battle as available, but did not catch up with the main body.

The Tiger battalion moved by night into its forward assembly area north of Tondorf on 12 December 1944.  While the men knew that they were attached to Peiper’s regiment, the attack orders were kept secret until the last moment.  Peiper briefed his battalion and company commanders on 14 December, but the tank commanders and crews were not informed of their mission until the night before the advance.

Notes:

(1) U.S. Army, ETHINT 10 and 11: 1 SS Pz Regt (11-24 Dec 44), Interview with Obst (W-SS) Joachim Peiper, September 7, 1945, ETHINT 10 question 31, National Archives Building, Washington, DC.

(2) Werner Wendt, letter to author, 6 November 1995.

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